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About 
 
Shortly after the end of the Kosovo war, the last of the Yugoslav dissolution wars, the
Balkan Reconstruction Observatory was set up jointly by the Hellenic Observatory, the
Centre for the Study of Global Governance, both institutes at the London School of
Economics (LSE), and the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw).
A brainstorming meeting on Reconstruction and Regional Co-operation in the Balkans
was held in Vouliagmeni on 8-10  July 1999, covering the issues of security,
democratisation, economic reconstruction and the role of civil society. It was attended
by academics and policy makers from all the countries in the region, from a number of
EU countries, from the European Commission, the USA and Russia. Based on ideas and
discussions generated at this meeting, a policy paper on Balkan Reconstruction and
European Integration was the product of a collaborative effort by the two LSE institutes
and the wiiw. The paper was presented at a follow-up meeting on Reconstruction and
Integration in Southeast Europe in Vienna on 12-13 November 1999, which focused on
the economic aspects of the process of reconstruction in the Balkans. It is this policy
paper that became the very first Working Paper of the wiiw Balkan Observatory
Working Papers series. The Working Papers are published online at www.balkan-
observatory.net, the internet portal of the wiiw Balkan Observatory. It is a portal for
research and communication in relation to economic developments in Southeast Europe
maintained by the wiiw since 1999. Since 2000 it also serves as a forum for the Global
Development Network Southeast Europe (GDN-SEE) project, which is based on an
initiative by The World Bank with financial support from the Austrian Ministry of
Finance and the Oesterreichische Nationalbank. The purpose of the GDN-SEE project
is the creation of research networks throughout Southeast Europe in order to enhance
the economic research capacity in Southeast Europe, to build new research capacities by
mobilising young researchers, to promote knowledge transfer into the region, to
facilitate networking between researchers within the region, and to assist in securing
knowledge transfer from researchers to policy makers. The wiiw Balkan Observatory
Working Papers series is one way to achieve these objectives. 
The wiiw Balkan Observatory Global Development Network 
Southeast Europe 
This study has been developed in the framework of research networks initiated and monitored by wiiw
under the premises of the GDN–SEE partnership. 
 
 
The Global Development Network, initiated by The World Bank, is a global network of
research and policy institutes working together to address the problems of national and
regional development. It promotes the generation of local knowledge in developing and
transition countries and aims at building research capacities in the different regions.  
 
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies is a GDN Partner Institute and
acts as a hub for Southeast Europe. The GDN–wiiw partnership aims to support the
enhancement of economic research capacity in Southeast Europe, to promote
knowledge transfer to SEE, to facilitate networking among researchers within SEE and
to assist in securing knowledge transfer from researchers to policy makers. 
 
The GDN–SEE programme is financed by the Global Development Network, the
Austrian Ministry of Finance and the Jubiläumsfonds der Oesterreichischen
Nationalbank.  
 
For additional information see www.balkan-observatory.net, www.wiiw.ac.at and
www.gdnet.org 
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This research paper attempts to find explanatory variables for foreign banks activity in SEE and 
CEE, mainly among three categories of factors: FDI, bilateral trade, and EU policies. We proxy 
bilateral banking activity by the consolidated foreign claims of reporting banks between source and 
recipient countries. Our sample includes 12 source countries (of which 10 are EU members) and 16 
recipient countries (from SEE, CEE and former Soviet Union), and it covers the 1995-2004 period. 
We found that bilateral trade and the interest rate differential are significant and bear the expected 
sign, which means that foreign banks follow the customer and exploit profit opportunities. Foreign 
direct investment (FDI) was found to be weakly significant and only with a two-year lag, which 
means that banking activity is generated by non-financial FDI only after that FDI matures. Banking 
sector reform, a proxy for EU policies imposed to Eastern European countries, also appears 
significant. Lack of corruption is important, while distance does not matter. This paper also finds 
that an increase in foreign banks’ activity in a recipient country is correlated with an increase in the 
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1. Introduction and context 
 
Banking activity is increasing at a fast pace in the emerging economies, and in CEE and SEE 
countries in particular. Many foreign banks entered the emerging markets in this area, driving the 
FDI in the banking sector from 2.5 bn. USD during the interval 1991-1995 to 67.5 bn. USD during 
the interval 2001-October 2005. In the transition economies from CEE and SEE, the banking sector 
has become overwhelmingly dominated by foreign banks. 
 
 
Table 1. Share of bank assets held by foreign banks, selected transition economies 
 1990  2004* 
Albania 0  89 
Bulgaria 0  79 
Croatia -  88 
Czech Republic  10  96 
Estonia -  97 
Hungary 10  83 
Poland 3  68 




*latest available year 
**including the privatization of BCR, finalized in December 2005 




More advanced reformers like Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland experienced the largest 
inflows in total, much of it in the earlier years, while Romania, Bulgaria or other SEE countries 
received banking FDI at a later stage. On average, the share of foreign banks in total assets is even 
higher in SEE countries (72%), than in the NMS (62%). An explanation could be the existence of 
larger domestic capital in NMS, when transition started. Banking (financial) FDI as a share in total 
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Table 2. Main banking investors in SEE-7, by country of origin, 2004 
Country Total  assets,  bn. 
euro 
Market share, % 
Austria 24.9  30.2 
Italy 16.5  20.0 
Greece 5.9  7.2 
France 3.3  4.0 
Hungary 2.9  3.5 
Netherlands 2.8  3.4 
USA 2.1  2.6 
Germany 0.7  0.8 
Turkey 0.6  0.8 
Slovenia 0.1  0.2 





When CEE countries are also considered, other important countries of origin are Sweden, UK and 
Belgium. 
 
Most of the foreign banks (70%) investing in this region have a regional strategy (Domanski, 
2005). 
 
Table 3. International banking groups in SEE-7, 2004 
Banking group  Market share, % 
UniCredit 12.6 
Raiffeisen 9.8 
BA-CA (HVB Group)  8.0 
Banca Intesa  6.9 
Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank  4.7 
Erste Bank  4.1 
Societe Generale  3.9 
OTP 3.5 
National Bank of Greece  2.6 
ING   2.0 
Note: UniCredit and HVB merged in 2005 
Source: BA-CA Report (2005) 
 
 
For more banking sector development and perspectives in SEE and CEE countries, see ECB 
(2004), Stubos and Tsikripis (2004), BA-CA Report (2005). 
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Foreign banks’ contribution to economic development is under-researched in SEE countries. 
Naaborg et al. (2001) found that foreign banks have different behaviour than local banks and that 
they are more cost-effective; yet, they do not contribute much to credits, and have a rather limited 
contribution to development; this could be summarized by a cherry-picking behavior. The main 
focus of this paper is not on the effects of foreign banks activity (whether or not the local banking 
systems or the local economy benefited from the entry of foreign banks). For such analysis, see e.g. 
Fries et. al, 2002; Engerer and Schrooten, 2004. Nevertheless, the topic of foreign banks’ 
contribution to development (which is an effect) is linked to foreign banks’ determinants in the 
SEE economies (which is the initial cause). This is why section 5 of this paper makes an 
assessment of foreign banks’ impact on economic development, and in particular on quality of life 
and inequality measures. We neither deal with the profitability of foreign banks (for an interesting 
paper on this subject, see Havrylchyk and Jurzyk, 2005). Also, we do not account for the strategy 
(restructuring in the home country may determine investment in a host country) and specificity 
(retail banking may have different determinants than investment banking) of foreign banks 
themselves (for a case study on this topic in an emerging economy, see de Paula, 2002). 
 
This research attempts to find explanatory variables for foreign banks activity in SEE and CEE, 
mainly among three categories of factors: FDI, bilateral trade, and direct and indirect EU 
policies/effects. 
 
The main research question refers to the banking activity drivers in SEE economies. We ask 
whether FDI, bilateral trade and EU policies matter. 
 
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. First, we undertake a thorough literature 
review on financial FDI determinants, with a focus on transition economies. Then, data and sample 
are described. We report the econometric analysis using cross-sectional and time-series dimensions. 
A section is devoted to the implications of our findings for economic development. The final 
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2. Literature review 
 
 
The topics related to FDI in the banking sector in SEE economies have not received the same 
attention as FDI in manufacturing. Internationalization in the banking sector, and the multinational 
services company, represent in fact a rising debate in the Western research area. In 2002, Bol et al. 
were able to mention only four studies on the determinants of foreign bank entry in European 
transition economies, three of which were actually qualitative research. By contrast, the review we 
have undertaken below refers to a number of seven econometric studies, of which five were 
published since 2004. This indicates that our paper fits into an international trend of increasing 
interest for the topic of the determinants of financial FDI in transition economies. 
 
 
Two major lines of thought can be adapted to explain the internationalization of financial services: 
one is the theory of the multinational firm (Hymer, 1960; Grubbel, 1977; Rugman, 1981; Gray and 
Gray, 1981; DeYoung and Nolle, 1996; Guisinger et al., 2003), the other one is the eclectic 
paradigm approach (Dunning, 1977, 1993, 1997, 2004; Cantwell and Narula, 2003).  In the first 
line of thought, multinational banks enter foreign markets based on bank size, bank profitability 
and degree of internationalization (Buch and Lipponer, 2004). 
 
This research proposal is nevertheless structured on a conceptual framework stemming from the 
eclectic paradigm approach, as the latter places more emphasis on location and integration factors, 
rather than only on firms’ determinants for expansion. We are addressing the issue of FDI in the 
banking sector and financial integration from the perspective of some transition economies, 
hence, it fits more with an Ownership-Location-Internalization approach. 
 
Gravity models variables are usually found significant for explaining foreign banks’ entry and 
activity. In particular trade, GDP, size and distance are in this category, but the studies reviewed in 
table 4 show that there is no consensus on the subject, at least as far as transition economies are 
regarded. Wezel (2004) also quotes conflicting results from various studies on the role of gravity 
factors on banking FDI. On the other hand, Demekas et al. (2005) confirmed the predominance of 
gravity factors in explaining FDI flows to CEE and SEE. 
   6
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A few groups of factors are widely acknowledged in the international literature to influence foreign 
banks’ entry (banking FDI). 
 
The first group of factors is the so-called “follow the customer”, which includes FDI (total, if the 
dependent variable is market share or foreign claims; or manufacturing FDI, if the dependent 
variable is banking FDI flows or stocks) and bilateral trade. Banks follow their clients, to exploit 
client information and to serve them in foreign markets. This approach is also known as „defensive 
expansion” (Grubbel, 1977 and Williams, 2002). Among the supporting studies for FDI, there are: 
Grubel (1977), Goldberg and Johnson (1990), Miller and Parkhe (1998). A survey among foreign 
banks operating in Bulgaria - Bitzenis (2004)- also found that ``follow the customer'' is the main 
motivation for foreign banks entering Bulgaria. Among the supporting studies for trade, there are: 
Grosse and Goldberg (1991), Yamori (1998), Buch (2000). On the other hand, as reported in Table 
4, Magri (2004) found no significance for FDI and Wezel (2004) found no significance for trade. 
An interesting result was reported by Christie (2003), who found  neither complementarity nor 
substitutability between FDI and trade in SEE. 
 
Moreover, the picking order model (Buch and Piazolo, 2000) holds that the structure of capital 
flows in an open economy is influenced by information costs, and it predicts the following order of 
foreign capital inflows: FDI – bank lending – portfolio investments. FDI should prevail in the 
initial stages of development, because it removes information disadvantage; as the economy 
advances and complies with international norms and regulations, in a more predictable institutional 
set up, information costs diminish and more speculative flows are encouraged.  
 
The second group of factors refers to market attractiveness, including GDP, size, distance, financial 
market development, profit opportunities. Most studies found GDP, size and distance (the latter 
with negative sign) as significant explanatory variables. However, Wezel (2004) or Sagari (1992) 
found GDP not significant. Aviat and Courdacier (2004) found distance significant, but not when 
trade is also considered. Financial market development may be found significant, in a few studies, 
but this was not the case of capital-scarce transition economies. Banking FDI goes where business 
opportunities in the financial sector are higher. Among the studies supporting this conclusion, one 
could mention Brealey and Kaplanis (1996) and Buch (1998). In a study on foreign banks in Italy,   8
Magri et al. (2004) found that profit opportunities (approximated by the interest rate spread 
between home and host country) play an important role in the entry decision. 
 
A third set of factors refer to risk (political risk, banking crises risk, currency risk). These factors 
appear with negative sign. 
 
Institutional factors (institutions, liberalization/openness, reform, corruption,) may be placed both 
in the “market” group and in the ``risk'' group, because they influence market attractiveness, while 
their malfunctioning increases risk in the host economy. Low quality institutions are associated 
with poor economic performance, while corruption and political risk increase transaction costs. 
Papaioannou (2005) and Bol et al. (2002) emphasize the role of reform and institutional factors in 
explaining financial FDI. Alfaro et al. (2003) also argue, based on cross-country regressions using a 
large sample of countries for the period 1971-1998, that institutional quality is the most important 
variable in explaining the so-called ``Lucas paradox'' (i.e. why capital does not flow from rich to 
poor countries). 
 
3. EU and OECD Policies 
 
Institutional factors are often linked to the EU convergence process, as far as European countries 
are concerned. Gligorov, Holzner and Landesmann (2004) estimate that EU integration prospects 
will act as a catalyst for financial FDI in SEE. On the one hand, Bol et al. (2002) found no evidence 
that an overall EU impact exists; financial FDI do not increase after EU accession is announced, 
and macroeconomic fundamentals are more important than institutional variables. On the other 
hand, many authors (Papaioannou, Aviat and Couerdacier, among others), consider that even trade 
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The institutional factors are less important in the decision to expand banking activities from a 
developed country to another developed country. This is normal, since the institutions are more 
developed in more advanced economies. However, the other determinants of banking FDI are 
generally the same. Hultman and McGee (1989) found that the determinants of foreign banking 
activities in US were foreign investment in US, foreign trade with US and US market size. 
Goldberg and Saunders (1980) found that bilateral trade was the main determinant of US banks 
expansion into UK. Fisher and Molyneux (1996) found that bilateral trade and bilateral FDI were 
the main determinants of European, Japanese and US banking FDI in London. Ursacki and 
Vertinsky (1992), in a study of banking FDI into Japan and Korea, found only market size, market 
potential and market regulation as the main determinants, while bilateral trade and bilateral FDI 
were not significant. However, these Asian markets were more regulated at that time, which 
reduced the incentives for FDI and explained the appearance of market regulation as a determinant 
factor. 
 
Regarding FDI treatment in South-East Europe, particularly the institutional barriers to FDI, OECD 
(2003)
1 published a comprehensive review of national policies. Banking FDI was also treated, but 
only Croatia and Serbia were found, at that time, to maintain equity-related barriers, while Romania 
and Albania had in place restrictions regarding banks’ management. Policy recommendations were 
made towards elimination of remaining barriers.  
 
As far as current account liberalization is concerned, OECD, in line with other international 
institutions, has been a supporter of full liberalization. However, more recently, IMF (2005) warned 
about local characteristics and recommended a more prudent approach.  
 
 
4. Econometric Methods and Data 
 
The dependent variable is foreign claims of reporting banks from country i to country j. This is not 
an uncommon dependent variable in recent studies; among other studies which used it, we mention 
                                                 
1 Liviu Voinea contributed to that report, covering Romania’s developments.   10
Aviat and Couerdacier (2004), Papaioannou (2005), Garcia-Herrera and Martinez-Peria (2005). 
Foreign claims are a good proxy for foreign banks’ entry and activity, but they do not include 
banking FDI as such, so we can use total FDI as explanatory variable. 
 
Our sample includes the following countries: 
o  Source countries: Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
o  Recipient countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, 
Ukraine.  
 
There are in total 12 countries of origin, of which 10 are EU members, and 16 recipient countries, 
of which 4 SEE (Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro), 8 CEE (the 3 Baltic states, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia), 2 former soviet republics (Russia, 
Ukraine), plus Cyprus and Turkey. This large sample is representative both for source countries, 
and for transition economies. 
 
The dependent variable is:  
o  Banking activity}: consolidated foreign claims of reporting banks between source and 
recipient countries. Source: BIS.  
The explanatory variables are:  
o  Trade: exports plus imports between source and recipient countries. Source: OECD STAN 
database  
o  FDI: direct investment position from source to recipient countries (stocks, outward flows). 
Source: Eurostat  
o  Real interest rate differential: between source and recipient countries. Source: IMF IFS (for 
both nominal interest rates and CPI).  
o  Banking Reform Index: for all recipient countries. Source: EBRD  
o  Corruption Index: for all recipient countries. Source: Transparency International  
o  Distance and weighted distance between source and recipient countries. Source: CHELEM 
database.  
o  GDP: in PPP terms, for all recipient countries. Source: IMF IFS.    11
 
We consider that banking reform and corruption index are proxies for EU policies in these Eastern 
European economies, because getting closer to EU means to accommodate with certain EU rules 
regarding financial liberalization and openness, and judicial system and competition. The interest 
rate differential could have been also a measure of EU integration, but it does not apply for our 
sample of recipient countries, which includes only one country (Slovakia) that applied for accession 
into the more restrictive Euro area. 
 
5. Empirical Findings 
 
Our panel is built around three dimensions (source and recipient country followed over time). It 
covers the 1995-2004 period; however, it is unbalanced due to missing or inexistent data. For 
example, FDI contains most missing data, with only 1286 data points out of 1920. Data for Serbia 
and Montenegro are only available starting from 2000. 
 
We take all the source-recipient pairs (i,j) to be one unit of observation, denoted by k, and we 
follow it over time, t.  Running a fixed-effects regression would mean a big loss of degrees of 
freedom (i.e. 16*12=192), so we focus on random effects estimators throughout the remaining of 
the paper. The equation we estimate thus is: 
 
t k k j j i t j t k t k v u D W Z X Y , , , , , + + + + + + = δ φ γ β α      (1) 
 
where  192 ,..., 1 = k  is the number of country pairs, t  is time and  16 ,..., 1 = j  is the number of 
recipient countries. There are independent variables that depend both on time and source and 
recipient country ( t k X , -- bilateral trade, FDI, the interest rate spread), variables that depend on the 
recipient country and time ( t j Z ,  -- GDP, the EBRD banking reform index, the corruption 
perception index), variables that depend on source and recipient country but do not vary over time 
( j i W , --geographical distance) and dummies for each recipient country ( j D ).  
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We use dummies to capture any recipient country fixed effect. By treating each country pair as one 
unit of observation in our panel, we might neglect possible recipient fixed-effects, hence dummy 
variables are an attempt to correct for this. In this way we attempt to capture country-specific fixed 
effects without losing too many degrees of freedom: recipient country dummies imply a loss of 16 
degrees of freedom, as opposed to 192 degrees in the case of country-pair fixed effects. 
 
 
As far as the error structure is concerned, we assume errors are heteroskedastic across country pairs 
and possibly auto correlated. This is, the random effect  k u is assumed to be i.i.d. distributed, with 
zero mean and variance depending on country pair  k u k ,
2 :σ . We assume (and test this assumption 
later on) the disturbance  t k v , to have an AR(1) component: 
 
      (2) 
 
Both the degree of persistence ( k ρ ) and the variance of the i.i.d., zero-mean error term ( k ,
2
ε σ ) are 
allowed to vary across country pairs. 
 
We first start with a basic setup, regressing our measure of bilateral banking activity (“Banking”, in 
logs) on bilateral trade (in logs), FDI, and the lags thereof, the Corruption and the EBRD banking 
reform indexes, the real interest rate differential, GDP and distance. One of the strengths of our 
approach is using a time dimension: it may take time until direct investment bear profit, and a pure 
cross-sectional approach cannot uncover this possible “time-to-build” lag. Moreover, there are 
other possible factors influencing bilateral banking activity. For example, the degree of openness or 
liberalization of the banking system: if foreign banks own a significant share of the banking sector 
in a particular country, then that banking system will more likely interact more with its foreign 
counterparts
2. Moreover, local institutions can matter for how strength of the ties between two 
banking systems. Weak institutions in the recipient country can hinder foreign banks’ investment. 
As a proxy for banking system liberalization we use the index provided in EBRD’s Transition 
                                                 
2 Note, however, that our measure of bilateral banking activity is net of intra-bank, cross-border flows. 
t k t k k t k v v , 1 , , ε ρ + = −  13
Reports
3. There are many variables that measure institutional quality, but we focus on 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index because it also has a time dimension. 
Other indices either offer only a snapshot of the institutional quality, or do not cover the period 
under study. We also account for physical distance between the source and recipient countries, as 
well as for the size of the recipient country (proxied by GDP), because these variables have been 
found to be significant in gravity models of bilateral trade. 
 
However, our purpose at this stage is to test the assumptions of heteroskedasticity and auto-
correlation. To test for heteroskedasticity in our panel we use a Likelihood Ratio test. We run our 
regression under both homoskedasticity (variance common across country pairs,  u k u σ σ = ,  and 
heteroskedasticity (variance different across pairs,  u k u σ σ ≠ , . (see Table 5). 
 
 
Table 5. Testing for heteroskedasticity. 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   no autocorrelation 
 
Estimated covariances      =       133          Number of obs      =       668 
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Number of groups   =       133 
Estimated coefficients     =        12          Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =  5.022556 
                                                               max =         8 
                                                Wald chi2(11)      =   8492.01 
Log likelihood             = -859.1133          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lbank |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ltrade |   .3700433   .1541601     2.40   0.016     .0678951    .6721915 
     ltrade1 |   .4950622   .2079163     2.38   0.017     .0875538    .9025706 
     ltrade2 |   .3194914   .1514079     2.11   0.035     .0227374    .6162454 
         fdi |   .0000351   .0000635     0.55   0.580    -.0000893    .0001595 
        fdi1 |  -.0000192   .0000722    -0.27   0.791    -.0001607    .0001224 
        fdi2 |   .0000647   .0000692     0.94   0.349    -.0000708    .0002003 
     corrupt |    .158609   .0308853     5.14   0.000     .0980749    .2191431     
        ebrd |   .3408643   .0592074     5.76   0.000     .2248199    .4569087 
         GDP |   4.38e-07   3.09e-07     1.42   0.156    -1.67e-07    1.04e-06 
       distw |   .0000336   .0000126     2.66   0.008     8.86e-06    .0000583 
     rirdiff |   .6783255    .195436     3.47   0.001     1.061373     .295278 
       _cons |  -2.948524   .1698369   -17.36   0.000    -3.281399    -2.61565 
                                                 




Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        homoskedastic 
Correlation:   no autocorrelation 
 
Estimated covariances      =         1          Number of obs      =       668 
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Number of groups   =       133 
Estimated coefficients     =        12          Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =  5.022556 
                                                               max =         8 
                                                Wald chi2(11)      =   1221.47 
Log likelihood             = -1119.947          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lbank |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ltrade |   .6035169   .2951705     2.04   0.041     .0249933    1.182041 
     ltrade1 |   .2668221   .3892279     0.69   0.493    -.4960505    1.029695 
     ltrade2 |   .3163378   .2749612     1.15   0.250    -.2225762    .8552519 
         fdi |   .0000849   .0001394     0.61   0.543    -.0001884    .0003582 
        fdi1 |   .0000593   .0001587     0.37   0.709    -.0002518    .0003703 
        fdi2 |   .0001912   .0001534     1.25   0.213    -.0001096    .0004919 
     corrupt |   .1634731    .069718     2.34   0.019     .0268283    .3001179     
        ebrd |   .3495659   .1226015     2.85   0.004     .1092714    .5898605 
         GDP |   5.79e-07   5.65e-07     1.03   0.305    -5.28e-07    1.69e-06 
       distw |   .0000193   .0000223     0.86   0.388    -.0000245     .000063 
     rirdiff |   1.376999   .4233715     3.25   0.001     2.206792    .5472062 




The difference between the restricted and unrestricted likelihood ratios is quite large (1119.95-
859.11) and tested against a Chi-squared distribution with 133 degrees of freedom (i.e. the number 
of pairs) gives a p-value below 0.1%.  Thus there is a significant amount of heteroskedasticity 
across country pairs, which, for example, makes the lags of trade become insignificant in the 
restricted regression. Therefore, we allow the standard deviation of residuals to differ for each pair 
of countries. 
 
Moreover, our variables are strongly correlated over time. Studying the correlation between (the 
log of) banking activity and (the log of) trade and FDI, both with and without a lag we find that the 
coefficients do not change much, as evident from Table 6. 
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Table 6. Correlation coefficients 
 
correlate  log(bank) log(trade) fdi   (obs=1110) 
 
                       |    log(bank)   log(trade)  fdi 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
       log(bank) |   1.0000 
       log(trade) |   0.7676   1.0000 
                  fdi |   0.3003   0.3457   1.0000 
 
correlate  log(bank) log(trade(-1)) fdi(-1) (obs=1074) 
 
                           |    log(bank)  log(trade(-1))  fdi(-1) 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
           log(bank) |   1.0000 
     log(trade(-1)) |   0.7723   1.0000 
                fdi(-1) |   0.3105   0.3468   1.0000 
 
 
This implies that our explanatory variables are strongly correlated over time, so we test for the 
possibility that errors are also auto correlated. The test used, provided by Stata, (command: xtserial) 
posits different correlation coefficient across pairs as the alternative hypothesis to no correlation 
( 0 = k ρ v.  0 ≠ k ρ  in equation [2]). The resulting F-statistic has an associated p-value below 0.1%, 
so the hypothesis of AR (1) errors cannot be rejected. The results after adjusting for both 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the residual structure are given in Table 7 (Panel A). 
However, we can further improve the model's fit by allowing the autocorrelation coefficient to vary 
across country-pairs. Although we don't formally test this hypothesis, it improves the model's 
significance and has a higher likelihood (-224.34 as opposed to -329.36, as evident from Panel B in 
Table 7). 
 
Table 7. A: Common autocorrelation coefficients across country pairs 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (0.8543) 
 
Estimated covariances      =       112          Number of obs      =       647 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =       112 
Estimated coefficients     =        12          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =  5.776786 
                                                               max =         8 
                                                Wald chi2(11)      =   1258.32   16
Log likelihood             = -329.3619          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lbank |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ltrade |   .2902761   .0807208     3.60   0.000     .1320662     .448486 
     ltrade1 |   .5691691   .0828577     6.87   0.000     .4067711    .7315672 
     ltrade2 |   .2406174   .0735052     3.27   0.001     .0965499    .3846849 
         fdi |  -.0000174   .0000271    -0.64   0.521    -.0000706    .0000358 
        fdi1 |  -.0000117   .0000295    -0.40   0.691    -.0000694     .000046 
        fdi2 |   .0000322   .0000305     1.06   0.291    -.0000276     .000092 
     corrupt |   .0392151   .0358322     1.09   0.274    -.0310147    .1094449     
        ebrd |    .101539   .0674741     1.50   0.132    -.0307077    .2337857 
         GDP |   1.12e-06   3.98e-07     2.81   0.005     3.38e-07    1.90e-06 
       distw |   .0000134   .0000245     0.55   0.585    -.0000346    .0000613 
     rirdiff |  -.0572137   .1290536    -0.44   0.658    -.3101541    .1957267 




Table 7. B: Different autocorrelation coefficients across country pairs 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   panel-specific AR(1) 
 
Estimated covariances      =       112          Number of obs      =       647 
Estimated autocorrelations =       112          Number of groups   =       112 
Estimated coefficients     =        12          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =  5.776786 
                                                               max =         8 
                                                Wald chi2(11)      =   8706.90 
Log likelihood             = -224.3467          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lbank |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ltrade |   .3542911   .0456089     7.77   0.000     .2648993    .4436829 
     ltrade1 |   .5564705   .0397686    13.99   0.000     .4785254    .6344155 
     ltrade2 |   .2675301    .038718     6.91   0.000     .1916442    .3434159 
         fdi |  -.0000231   .0000256    -0.90   0.368    -.0000733    .0000272 
        fdi1 |  -4.59e-06   .0000272    -0.17   0.866     -.000058    .0000488 
        fdi2 |   .0000696   .0000282     2.47   0.014     .0000143     .000125 
     corrupt |    .146919   .0235631     6.24   0.000     .1007362    .1931018     
        ebrd |   .2284642   .0451068     5.06   0.000     .1400564     .316872 
         GDP |   6.10e-07   2.77e-07     2.20   0.027     6.77e-08    1.15e-06 
       distw |   .0000359   .0000137     2.62   0.109     9.07e-06    .0000627 
     rirdiff |   .2989419   .1116962     2.68   0.097     .5178623    .0800215 
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The results in Panel B of Table 7, after accounting for heteroskedasticity and different auto-
correlation coefficients among country pairs, show that foreign direct investments need a “time-to-
build”, while trade does not. Bilateral trade increases banking activity between the two countries in 
the same period, while it takes up to two years for FDI to bear profits and spur banking activity (i.e. 
by repatriating these profits). 
 
Institutional factors matter as well. More openness in the banking sector generates more bilateral 
banking activity via two channels: a higher share of the banking system in the recipient country is 
owned by foreign banks and there are fewer restrictions on capital flows. Moreover, the perceived 
lack of corruption in the recipient country also attracts foreign banks (the negative sign on this 
coefficient stems for the way the Corruption index is constructed: the countries at the top of the 
rankings are those with less corruption). 
 
The recipient's GDP is significant at 5%, while the real interest rate differential is weakly 
significant, with a p-value slightly lower than 10%. We can conjecture that banks go into the 
developing markets under study for at least two reasons: to profit from economies of scale (the 
larger the recipient market, the better) and from the positive real interest rate spread. 
 
Besides these factors, there may be many others that can make a recipient country generally 
attractive for foreign banks. To capture these factors we extend our setup by including a recipient 
country dummy variable (see Table 8). 
 
 
Table 8. A: Results with recipient country dummies and real interest rate. 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   panel-specific AR(1) 
 
Estimated covariances      =       112          Number of obs      =       647 
Estimated autocorrelations =       112          Number of groups   =       112 
Estimated coefficients     =        25          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =  5.776786 
                                                               max =         8 
                                                Wald chi2(23)      =   6550.92 
Log likelihood             = -191.0593          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000   18
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lbank |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ltrade |   .3973162   .0627271     6.33   0.000     .2743733    .5202591 
     ltrade1 |   .5465901   .0471147    11.60   0.000      .454247    .6389331 
     ltrade2 |   .1506361   .0517305     2.91   0.004     .0492462     .252026 
         fdi |  -.0000278   .0000246    -1.13   0.258    -.0000761    .0000204 
        fdi1 |   3.97e-06    .000026     0.15   0.878    -.0000469    .0000549 
        fdi2 |   .0000628   .0000274     2.29   0.022     9.02e-06    .0001166 
     corrupt |   .1049221   .0340004     3.09   0.002    .0382825     .1715616    
        ebrd |   .1340595   .0750512     1.79   0.074    -.0130382    .2811571     
         GDP |   1.19e-06   4.37e-07     2.73   0.006     3.37e-07    2.05e-06 
       distw |   .0000243   .0000161     1.51   0.132    -7.33e-06    .0000559 
     rirdiff |   -.065519   .1193807    -0.55   0.583    -.2995009    .1684629 






Table 8. B: Results with recipient country dummies and nominal interest rate. 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   panel-specific AR(1) 
 
Estimated covariances      =       112          Number of obs      =       650 
Estimated autocorrelations =       112          Number of groups   =       112 
Estimated coefficients     =        25          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =  5.803571 
                                                               max =         8 
                                                Wald chi2(23)      =  13876.01 
Log likelihood             = -170.0734          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lbank |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ltrade |   .4283307   .0597917     7.16   0.000     .3111411    .5455203 
     ltrade1 |   .5147624   .0352867    14.59   0.000     .4456018     .583923 
     ltrade2 |   .1507488   .0476031     3.17   0.002     .0574484    .2440492 
         fdi |  -.0000267   .0000221    -1.21   0.228    -.0000701    .0000167 
        fdi1 |  -7.73e-07   .0000242    -0.03   0.974    -.0000482    .0000466 
        fdi2 |   .0000468    .000026     1.80   0.072    -4.14e-06    .0000977 
     corrupt |   .0864082   .0314465     2.75   0.006     .0247742    .1480421     
        ebrd |   .1794569   .0705455     2.54   0.011     .0411903    .3177235     
         GDP |   1.64e-06   3.18e-07     5.15   0.000     1.01e-06    2.26e-06 
       distw |   .0000111   .0000142     0.78   0.433    -.0000167     .000039 
      irdiff |   .0131994   .0017166     7.69   0.000     .0098348     .016564 
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Table 8. C: Results with SEE dummies and real interest rate 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   panel-specific AR(1) 
 
Estimated covariances      =       112          Number of obs      =       647 
Estimated autocorrelations =       112          Number of groups   =       112 
Estimated coefficients     =        13          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =  5.776786 
                                                               max =         8 
                                                Wald chi2(12)      =   8620.73 
Log likelihood             = -214.2969          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lbank |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ltrade |   .4299533   .0522058     8.24   0.000     .3276318    .5322748 
     ltrade1 |   .5332211   .0510011    10.46   0.000     .4332608    .6331814 
     ltrade2 |   .2258612    .046307     4.88   0.000     .1351011    .3166213 
         fdi |  -.0000175   .0000258    -0.68   0.499     -.000068    .0000331 
        fdi1 |  -3.07e-06   .0000277    -0.11   0.912    -.0000573    .0000512 
        fdi2 |   .0000749   .0000283     2.65   0.008     .0000194    .0001303 
     corrupt |   .0561599   .0139159     4.04   0.000     .0288853    .0834346 
        ebrd |   .2176391   .0414307     5.25   0.000     .1364365    .2988417 
         GDP |   1.49e-06   2.83e-07     5.27   0.000     9.35e-07    2.04e-06 
       distw |   .0000222   .0000111     1.99   0.047     3.36e-07     .000044 
     rirdiff |   .2195365   .1071346     2.05   0.040     .0095566    .4295164     
      SEEdum |   .5679909   .0487211    11.66   0.000     .4724993    .6634825 





Our findings about FDI being significant with two lags only and trade both contemporaneously and 
with lags carry through in this setup as well. However, real interest rate has become insignificant, 
so this variable is not robust in our setup. On the other hand, we do find that the nominal interest 
rate differential is strongly significant and has the expected sign. Moreover (not reported here) we 
find the nominal interest rate differential to be significant in the setup without dummies as well. 
What can account for the significance and robustness of the nominal interest rate differential? A 
possible explanation is that banks pursue some short-term investment strategies, taking advantage 
of the nominal spread and hedging the exchange rate risk. Alternatively, high nominal returns 
imply high growth rates (albeit in nominal terms) for the foreign investor. 
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All country dummies have a positive and significant coefficient, with two exceptions: Latvia and 
Slovenia. A plausible reason for the lack of significance is that Latvia and Slovenia both have a 
small population, which is less conducive to large scale banking activity. Moreover, since our focus 
is mainly on SEE economies, we also run a setup with one single dummy for these countries (Panel 
C). While the previous results also carry through here (trade, lag FDI significant, etc.) we notice 
that real interest rate has a lower p-value (now being significant at 5 percent) compared with Table 
7B (i.e. without dummy variables), which further confirms our hypothesis that banks also follow 
profit opportunities. Nominal interest rates compare to nominal interest rates in the home country, 
plus the exchange rate evolution – when profit margins are concerned on short term. This might 
explain why nominal rates have a higher statistical relevance than real rates as determinants of 
foreign banking activity. 
 
Moreover, conditional on trade, FDI, corruption, banking sector liberalization, real interest rate 
differential and distance, we find that SEE countries had attracted more banking activity than the 
rest, reflected in the positive and significant coefficient of the dummy variable. Probably foreign 
banks see more potential for growth in SEE (where the degree of financial intermediation was more 
limited), compared to the NMS countries, once they condition for the factors above. As far as the 
model fit is concerned, the model with one dummy for SEE is between the one with no dummy 
variable (Table 7B) and the one with dummy variables for all recipients (Table 8A). 
 
6. Foreign banks' impact on inequality and economic development  
 
The topic of foreign banks’ determinants might be too abstract, in particular if one would like to 
draw policy recommendations for recipient countries. We may have established the determinant 
variables for attracting banking FDI, but is it worthy? Do recipient countries benefit from an 
increase in foreign banks’ activity? 
 
There is a vast body of literature debating the implications of financial liberalization on economic 
development and poverty. For an interesting review of the main theories on this subject, see Gunter, 
Cohen and Lofgren (2005). Yet, there is no general consensus regarding the impact of foreign 
banks in the recipient country. In the introduction to this paper, we mentioned a study from   21
Naaborg et al. (2001) stating the rather limited contribution of foreign banks to economic 
development. Uiboupin (2005) finds that foreign banks contribute to lower interest rates and to 
enhanced competition on the local market. Engerer and Schrooten (2004) report foreign banks’ 
contribution to improved financial performance even of local banks, signaled by a reduction of 
non-performing loans. On the other hand, Cornia (2005) considers that the entry of foreign banks 
did not raise competition, as those banks targeted only a few low-risk customers.  
 
These being said, in this section we attempt to assess the impact of foreign banks’ activity on the 
level of economic development of the recipient countries. We proxy development by two more 
refined measures which blend economic and sociological factors. One is the Gini coefficient, a 
measure of inequality in income distribution. The other one is the Human Development Index, a 
measure of the quality of life
4. The data for Gini and HDI covers 91 developing countries from 
Africa, Asia, Europe and Central and South America
5. The reasons for this sample selection are 
twofold: first, our initial sample consisted of 16 recipient countries, which is too small for making 
statistical inferences, given that the data for Gini and HDI are only available in cross-section (the 
survey is done at most every five years), and secondly, we do not include developed countries 
because they tend to have both high HDI and high banking activity, which would misleadingly 
improve the fit of our model. 
 
The summary statistics for Gini and HDI are presented in Table 9. On average, the most unequal 
countries (i.e. a higher Gini)are located in Central and South America and Africa, while Europe is 
more “equal”. European countries also rank first, on average, in terms of human development, 
followed by Central and South American ones. African countries are among the poorest developed 
countries in our sample. 
 
 
Table 9. Summary statistics for Gini and HDI 
 
  Africa  Asia  Europe C and S Am.
HDI: mean  .495  .688  .817  .759 
HDI: st. dev.  .125  .089 
 
.053 .086 
                                                 
4 Both variables are available on the UNDP website: http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/. The latest 
year available is 2001. 
5 The list of countries is available upon request.   22
Gini:  mean  (%) 43.8  41.8 31.5  45.8 
Gini: st. dev  10.05  8.34  7.73  9.22 
No. of obs.  32  22  18  19 
 
 
In order to assess the relationship between banking activity and economic development, we regress 
the two variables of interest on our previous measure of banking activity divided by GDP and three 
dummy variables (for Africa, Asia and Europe). Since we only have cross-sectional data, we use 
the foreign claims of the rest of the world on each country in the sample
6. The results are given in 
Table 10. 
 
Table 10. The impact of banking activity on development 
 
 
Number of obs =      91 
F(  4,    86) =   10.19 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
R-squared     =  0.2630 
Adj R-squared =  0.2288 
Root MSE      =   9.000 
 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
        gini |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|      
-------------+-------------------------------------------- 
     Banking |    -.00252     .00172    -1.46   0.146      
        Dafr |   -2.66471    2.64295    -1.01   0.316     
       Dasia |   -4.49773    2.83895    -1.58   0.117     
        Deur |  -12.36849    3.23888    -3.82   0.000     




Number of obs =      91 
F(  4,    86) =   42.71 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
R-squared     =  0.6612 
Adj R-squared =  0.6409 
Root MSE      =  .09676 
 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
         hdi |     Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|    
-------------+------------------------------------------ 
     Banking | 3.64e-05   1.85e-05     1.97   0.052    
        Dafr |  -.25336     .02841    -8.92   0.000    
       Dasia |  -.06335     .03052    -2.08   0.041    
        Deur |   .03029     .03482     0.87   0.386    
       _cons |   .74282     .02369    31.36   0.000    
-------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                 
6 The data is for 2001 and is available from BIS.   23
 
There is a strong, significant correlation in the developing countries between the Human 
Development Index  and the foreign banks' activity. An increase in foreign banks' activity in a 
recipient country is correlated with an increase in the country's HDI. However, the correlation 
coefficient between banking activity and inequality is not significant, which means that a priori we 




7. Summary of the findings 
 
Trade and the interest rate differential are always significant and bear the expected sign. This 
means that foreign banks follow the customer and exploit profit opportunities. This finding is 
robust to inclusion of one or two lags or restricting the time dimension to 1999-2004 (for better 
data quality and availability). 
 
FDI is weakly significant only with a longer lag (2 years). A possible explanation is the existence 
of a time-to-build lag, as it takes more than one year for the FDI to become productive and operate 
at full-scale. After foreign investment becomes productive, more banking activity between the two 
countries is generated via, for example, intra-company loans or repatriated profits. Bilateral trade, 
on the other hand, needs no “time to build”, so in almost every setup we have tried we found it 
significant with at most one lag. 
 
Among variables reflecting institutional quality, we found the banking sector reform to be the most 
significant, positively influencing foreign banks' activity. We can consider this as a proxy for the 
degree and speed to which the EU policies have been adopted in recipient countries. That foreign 
banking activity comes with liberalization is no surprise and should represent an encouragement 
for laggards (in this area and elsewhere) to liberalize the banking sector. 
 
Distance is not significant (probably because most recipient countries in our sample have a direct 
border with EU). Insignificant fixed country effects are found only for a few countries having in 
common small population, which is less conducive for large scale banking activity.   24
 
To summarize, we found the following determinants for foreign banking activity in Eastern Europe: 
bilateral trade, the lag of FDI (at least 2 years earlier), interest rate differential, and banking sector 
reform (a proxy for EU policies imposed to these countries). 
 
This paper also finds that an increase in foreign banks’ activity in a recipient country is correlated 
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